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ABSTRACT
RONALD OERTEL: College Entry, Dropout and
Re-enrollment: The Role of Tuition and Labor Market
Conditions
(Under the direction of Wilbert van der Klaauw)
Industrial realignment in the United States, in part stemming from liberalized interna-
tional trade, has motivated policymakers to encourage ‘lifelong learning’ and skill retooling.
In light of these discussions it is important to understand current college going behavior, with
a particular focus on college entry or re-entry at older ages, which is already a nontrivial phe-
nomenon. I estimate a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of schooling and labor force
participation decisions over the life-cycle on a sample drawn from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79). Employing value function interpolation methods in solving the
dynamic programming problem, I estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood. My estimates
fit the observed patterns reasonably well. I then ask how enrollment behavior would change
in response to alterations in people’s opportunities, including subsidies targeted at individ-
uals already in the labor market. One such simulation shows that even a policy that fully
eliminates tuition for persons with at least one year of work experience will raise the number
of individuals who obtain a college degree by only 2.4%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Industrial realignment in the United States, in part stemming from liberalized interna-
tional trade, has motivated policymakers to encourage ‘lifelong learning’ and skill retooling.
In light of these discussions it is important to understand current college going behavior, with
a particular focus on college entry or re-entry at older ages. The latter is already a non-
trivial phenomenon, with those over 24 constituting roughly 40% of all male postsecondary
enrollments.
1.1 Goals
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze decisions to enter, leave and re-enter college
with the aid of a simple dynamic economic choice model. Using estimates of the model’s
parameters, the objective is to simulate the effects of several unprecedented policies aimed at
increasing college enrollment and college completion. One specific objective of my research is
to assess the effectiveness of policies aimed at inducing individuals to return to school. For
example, I evaluate the impact of tuition subsidies restricted to individuals who have entered
the labor market before attending or completing college. To accomodate this, I estimate a
dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of schooling and labor force participation decisions
over the life-cycle on a sample of 2313 young men drawn from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), covering the years 1978-2003.
My model incorporates a number of important features of college going behavior. First,
the model accounts for persistence in behavior over time through preferences, human capital
formation and learning. The model allows for habit persistence, where employment in the
previous period may affect the disutility of working in the current period, and incorporates
psychic costs of returning to school. Preference persistence is also captured through unob-
served heterogeneity in preferences. In addition, past schooling and work decisions affect
subsequent employment and education choices through their impact on wages. Secondly, in
my model agents learn about the match between their educational background and the labor
market. The quality of this match directly affects earnings, and it is assumed to remain
constant for as long as an individual does not obtain additonal schooling. If they do return
to school a new match quality is drawn. Initially unaware of the quality of their match,
individuals infer it over time from the wage offers they receive. The distribution of match
qualities is estimated in the model, and varies with the level of education and with the state
unemployment rate. In this way my model captures any permanent effects of local labor
market conditions at the time of leaving school.
Third, my model captures changes in the costs of college attendance and in labor market
conditions. In my model agents make forecasts concerning future tuition and unemployment
rates in their state of residence based on actual realizations of these variables in each year.
Both of these affect their well-being and therefore condition their choices. Changes in college
costs and labor market conditions over time may affect individual decisions to enter or leave
college.
Employing value function interpolation methods in solving the dynamic programming
problem, I estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood. My estimates fit the observed pat-
terns reasonably well. I then ask how enrollment behavior would change in response to
alterations in people’s opportunities, including subsidies targeted at individuals already in
the labor market. One such simulation shows that even a policy that fully eliminates tuition
for persons with at least one year of work experience will raise the number of individuals who
obtain a college degree by only 2.4%.
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1.2 Literature
A substantial body of work exists that evaluates the sensitivity of enrollment to tuition and
financial aid. Estimates of contemporaneous effects do not diverge very widely. Kane (1994)
estimates the impact of a $1000 decrease in public tuition in 2004 dollars. He finds it associated
with increases in the college attendance rates in the bottom and top income quartiles of 5.3
and 5.0 percentage points, respectively, among young 18- to 19-year-old African-American
high school graduates, and by 2.9 and 0.7 percentage points among whites.1 The same paper
finds much smaller effects for an increase in Pell grants of similar size. Dynarski (2000) finds
increases of 3.2 to 3.6 percentage points in Georgia’s enrollment rate among 18- to 19-year-
olds for each $1000 in the state’s HOPE scholarship tuition subsidy. A study by van der
Klaauw (2002) estimates that a $1000 fellowship offer raises the probability of attending the
college making the offer by 2.8 to 3.8 percentage points. Additional studies, reviewed in Kane
(2003), find similar estimates in this range. Older studies surveyed in Leslie and Brinkman
(1987) also showed similar effects.
Another literature has examined the reasons for halting and resuming education. Chuang
(1994) and Light (1996) find that ability measures, father’s education, family income, and the
local unemployment rate all have positive and significant effects on re-enrollment. In addition,
Chuang finds negative effects for marriage, fertility, and employment on re-enrollment, while
Light finds hourly wages, weekly hours, and tuition all negatively influencing the decision to
re-enroll. The results are roughly consistent with the view that individuals re-enroll when the
benefits are high (e.g. high ability) or the costs are low (e.g. high local unemployment, low
current wages).
For policy purposes, researchers must take note of the fact that estimated behavioral
rules reflect both agents’ preferences and the constraints they face. Policies that are novel
in scope or nature can alter these behavioral rules, a complication first laid out by Lucas
(1976). Evaluating unprecedented policies thus requires having estimates of basic structural
parameters that can be reasonably expected to remain robust to changes in policy. One
1The rates of increase in the college attendance rate corresponding to the percentage point increases quoted
above are 14% and 8% for African-Americans and 7% and 1% for whites.
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response to this challenge has been the development of dynamic structural models, which
formalize the period-by-period decisions made by forward-looking agents. The evaluation of
policy in this approach is a two-step process. In the first step the parameters that describe
the agents’ preferences are estimated. Once these estimates have been obtained, the second
step forecasts the response to a policy change by a simulation of the agents’ decision paths
after certain parameters in the constraints facing the agent are altered.
In this vein, Keane and Wolpin (1997) investigate the ‘career decisions of young men.’
They estimate a model for five alternatives (home, school, military, blue-collar, white-collar).
Permanent unobserved differences in aptitude for each of the five careers are formalized as
different ‘types’ of agents, and the proportions of these in the population are estimated along
with the remaining parameters in the model. Keane and Wolpin simulate the effect of a
universal tuition subsidy. This policy is predicted to raise high school and college graduation
rates.2 On the other hand, it would have a negligible impact on lifetime utility, with the
greatest benefits reaped by those who would have attended college anyway. The importance
of allowing for permanent agent heterogeneity when performing policy simulations is further
underscored by Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), who evaluate the impact of ‘outlawing’ work by
high school students. They estimate a modest rise (from 82% to 84%) in the high school
graduation rate.
With a similar model, Keane and Wolpin (2000) perform policy experiments aimed at
reducing racial differences in school attainment. A bonus paid to all high school graduates
would significantly reduce dropout rates, though it could not affect gaps attributable to
endowment differences already in place by age 16. A wage subsidy, another policy experiment
considered in the study, would close some of the gap in lifetime earnings but would reduce
educational attainment, as working becomes relatively more attractive, even at young ages.
My research builds on the contributions just described by adopting the structural ap-
2One important caveat is that these are partial equilibrium models. In a general equilibrium model, by
contrast, a policy that reduces the direct cost of schooling can be expected to lower the economic benefit
from schooling, as the increased supply of educated workers makes them less valuable, thereby mitigating
the policy’s direct positive incentives. In recent work, Lee (2005) finds that the estimated general equilibrium
responses to his tuition subsidy experiment are in fact somewhat smaller than the partial equilibrium estimates
in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
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proach taken by Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), and Lee (2005)
while extending their models to address the following considerations. First, the approach
taken in this thesis is more sensitive to the timing of young persons’ enrollment decisions.
A fair number of individuals does return to school after an absence, but a return after a
long absence is quite uncommon. One reason for this may be found in habit persistence -
where the utility associated with non-schooling choices increases with the number of years
the person opts for these alternatives - and increasing psychic costs (or lower nonmonetary
benefits) associated with a return to schooling at older ages. Second, the framework I pro-
pose acccounts for the importance of realized and expected future labor market conditions
and college tuition costs at the time of the choice decision to attend school, join the labor
market or enter the nonschool-nonemployment state. Third, it more directly addresses the
importance of imperfect information about how well one will fare in the labor market at the
education level attained in a given year. There is heterogeneity across workers in the quality
of the match between skills and the labor market, where some workers may return to school
after discovering that their earnings potential at their current education level is worse than
expected. In such a case they may acquire additional education in the hope of improving their
future match with the labor market. The model I propose incorporates this type of learning,
and incorporates individual expectations and stochastic realizations of college costs and local
labor market conditions. In the next chapter I present this model and discuss how it will be
estimated. This is followed by a discussion of the data in chapter 3, and a presentation and
discussion of the estimates in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will present results from several policy
experiments, while chapter 6 provides a conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Model and Estimation Issues
I begin by describing the general choice-theoretic framework I will use to characterize
schooling and employment decisions, followed by a more detailed discussion of the parametric
specifications of the model’s components.
2.1 Dynamic Stochastic Discrete Choice
My model belongs to the class of dynamic stochastic discrete choice models. In this kind
of setting individuals aim to maximize their expected lifetime utility by choosing, in each
period, one of a small number of mutually exclusive options. Utility will in general not be
intertemporally separable because current utility depends crucially on past choices. However,
tractability requires that utility be additively separable over time.
The options differ in their rewards, which are summarized by the choice-specific value
function Vitk. The assumption of additive separability lets us write these rewards as the sum
of current and discounted expected future rewards. For individual i choosing option k in
period t this is expressed as
Vitk(Sit) = Ritk(Sit) + δEtVt+1(Sit, yitk = 1),
where δ is the discount factor. As is made explicit here, present and future rewards will in
general depend on both the current choice (yitk = 1) and on the vector of state variables Sit,
which include salient aspects of the individual’s choice history.
Determining the best choice in this period appears to be difficult because calculating the
future rewards EtVt+1 requires a determination of the optimal choice in the next period:
EtVt+1(Sit, yitk = 1) = Et max
k˜
Vt+1,k˜(Sit, yitk = 1), k˜ = 1, ...,K.
The agent’s decision problem can be solved by backward recursion, though, if we assume
a finite time horizon. There is a terminal period T in which the individual chooses the
alternative yielding the greatest reward. We do not observe all aspects of the rewards faced
by the agents, but we can determine the probability that at T option k is the best alternative
given the individual’s state SiT :
PiTk(SiT ) = P (yiTk = 1|SiT )
= P (ViTk(SiT ) > ViT k˜(SiT ),∀k˜ #= k),
Having computed the probabilities attached to each of the three options, we (and the agents)
can determine the expected value of VT from the perspective of T-1:
ET−1VT (SiT ) =
K∑
k=1
PiTk(SiT )ET−1ViTk(SiT ). (2.1)
Backing up in time, we can consider choices in the penultimate decision period (T-1). Con-
ditional on the values of the state variables, a given choice entails current rewards and a
particular level of expected future utility, ET−1VT (SiT−1, yT−1k = 1), a value we have already
computed. We again calculate the utilities and probabilities attached to each option, and
thus determine the expected ‘remaining lifetime’ utility (ET−2VT−1(SiT−1)), conditional on
the state variables. This latter quantity will be required for computing the probability of
choosing any option k in period T-2. We proceed in this manner, retreating period by period,
all the way to the first possible point at which a decision can be made.
Such a ‘solution’ to the model is always conditional on the particular values taken by the
parameters. When parameters are estimated, they will be updated during the search for a
maximum. This change alters not only the current rewards of a choice but also the probabil-
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ities of any future choices. We will then need to re-compute Et−1Vt (or some approximation
to it) for all t and for every feasible state vector, Sit.
2.2 Model Specification
In modelling schooling and work decisions, a period is taken to be a year, and we focus
on the primary activity an individual chooses for a given year. From age a0 onward until
age aT = 67, agents either work (unpaid) in the home (yit1 = 1), work for pay (yit2 = 1), or
attend school. As long as an agent has not attended a total of 12 years of education, there
is only one schooling type available, which is referred to as ‘high school’ (yit3 = 1). The
age-of-first-choice a0 is determined by the state’s compulsory school attendance law. In the
majority of states these laws require attendance until the 16th birthday, but certain states
require attendance until the 17th or 18th birthday (Angrist and Krueger 1991). Once a person
has attended 12 years of education, the number of options increases to four as agents may
now opt to attend either a four-year college (yit4 = 1) or a two-year college (yit5 = 1). To
avoid the need to model household formation decisions, which affect women’s education and
work choices to a larger extent than men’s, I restrict consideration to the decisions of young
men. For simplicity, in describing the model and the derivation of the optimal decision rule
in each period, I will focus initially on a choice set that does not distinguish between the two-
and four-year college options (a choice set with options 1 through 3). The extention to the
larger choice set is straightforward and will be discussed later.
The per-period utility function can be written as
Ritk = R(Cit, Dit, yit−1,2, Ageit, Racei, e˜itk;βk), k = 1, ...,K.
Here Cit represents the indvidual’s consumption in period t. Dit stands for the number of
years that have elapsed since the individual last left school,and yit−1,2 is an indicator variable
for whether the individual worked in the previous period. I include both as measures of
the impact of past choices on preferences.1 For example, having worked in the previous
1This kind of ‘habit persistence’ has been found to be of empirical importance, e.g. in the context of
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period may alter the utility of working, in addition to raising whatever wage offer is received.
Similarly, even for two individuals of the same age the psychic benefit of reentering school
may well differ depending on how long each has been away from school. Rewards are also
allowed to differ by age. Finally e˜itk is a taste shock, while βk is a vector of utility parameters
specific to option k. More specifically I adopt the following per-period utility function
Ritk = β0Cit + βk1 + βk2Dit + βk3I[yit−1,2 = 1]
+ fk(Ageit) + βk4I[Race #= ‘white’] (2.2)
+ e˜itk, k = 1, ...,K.
This specification assumes a marginal utility of consumption (β0) that is constant across
choices. The influence of age on rewards is captured by a number of indicator variables for
different age groups. Differences in preferences across races are captured by an indicator
variable, with ‘whites’ being the excluded group.
In addition to differences in observed characteristics and transitory shocks, agents may
also differ in permanent and unobserved traits. I interpret these as differences in preferences,
and formalize such permanent heterogeneity by writing the unobserved determinants of utility
as sums of permanent and transitory components,
e˜itk = u˜ik + u˜itk, k = 1, ...,K.
The transitory taste shocks are jointly normally distributed, while the permanent components
u˜ik are assumed to follow a discrete distribution with M points of support as in Mroz and
Guilkey (1995) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). These mass points are interpreted as groups
of persons in the population. The preferences of individuals differ across groups. Each group
m has a representation of fraction pim in the population. These fractions are estimated along
with the other parameters. Groups are also allowed to differ in habit persistence. Permanent
taste heterogeneity is therefore captured by group-specific intercepts βk1(mi), and group-
women’s labor supply (Eckstein and Wolpin 1989, van der Klaauw 1996).
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specific parameters describing the influences of time away from school (βk2(mi)) and of work
in the previous year (βk3(mi)). In the empirical implementation of the model M was set to
3. The population proportions of the three groups are parameterized as
pi1 = (1 + exp{γ0})−1,
pi2 = (1 + exp{γ1})−1(1− pi1), and
pi3 = 1− pi1 − pi2.
As only differences in current and future utility levels between the options matter for
the determination of choices, some of the parameters will not be identified. Accordingly I
normalize all parameters specific to the home alternative to zero. That is, β1j = 0, j = 1, ..., 4
and f1(Ageit) = 0. Thus the preference parameters βkj , j = 1, ..., 4 and fk(Ageit), k = 2, ...,K
are to be interpreted as relative to home production. Similarly, I define differenced unobserved
components
eitk = e˜itk − e˜it1
= u˜ik − u˜i1 + u˜itk − u˜it1 (2.3)
≡ uik + uitk, k = 2, ...,K,
where the difference is taken with respect to the unobserved components of the ‘home’ al-
ternative. The differenced transitory taste shocks uitk are jointly normally distributed, with
variance σ2uk and covariance σukuk′ , and serially independent. I adopt the additional normal-
ization σu2 = 1 because the scale of the utility differences is also irrelevant to the determina-
tion of choices. As a result all preference parameters are measured relative to the variance of
the transitory unobserved components of the reward to working.
An individual with preferences as defined is confronted with a simple budget constraint,
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which is given by
Cit = Nit +WitI[yit,2 = 1]
− I(Eit ≥ 12)[T1itI[yit,4 = 1] + T2itI[yit,5 = 1]], (2.4)
where Nit is nonlabor income, Wit labor earnings, and T1it and T2it represent tuition at 4-year
and 2-year colleges. Earnings are only generated when the individual engages in work in the
sense of the model, and tuition must only be paid when attending school beyond 12 years of
education (Eit ≥ 12). This formulation assumes away saving or borrowing.
Potential annual earnings Wit are defined by the log-earnings equation:
ln(Wit) = α1(mi) + α2Eit + α3Xit + α4X2it + α5Fit
+ α6I[Eit ≥ 12] + α7I[Eit − (Fit/2) ≥ 16]
+ α8URit + α9I[Race #= ‘white’] + ηit (2.5)
≡ W it + ηit.
This is a standard Mincerian loglinear wage equation, here allowing for diploma effects and a
contemporaneous effect of the local unemployment rate, URit, which is included as a measure
of local labor demand conditions. The intercept is allowed to differ between the M groups of
agents. The variables Eit and Xit are the accumulated stocks of education2 and (general) work
experience, which evolve according to Eit+1 = Eit+yit3+yit4+yit5 and Xit+1 = Xit+yit2. The
number of years at a 2-year college (Fit) yields an increment to earnings (α(2) + α(5)) that
may differ from the effect of other years of schooling. The college diploma effect, α7 requires
some explanation. It is assumed that half of one year’s worth of credits from a community
college can be transferred over when attending a 4-year college. As the other half a year’s
credits are assumed to be nontranferable, this also means that a year of community college
delays the time of obtaining a bachelor’s degree by half a year. Finally, ηit is a normal, serially
2I do not distinguish between successful and unsuccessful attempts to complete a year of education. See
Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) for an effort to use transcript information in estimation. Neither do I track the
quality of education, as Strayer (2002) does, nor investigate the match between student ability and college
quality. For such an attempt see Light and Strayer (2000).
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uncorrelated earnings shock with variance σ2η. This shock is independent of shocks to utility
conditional on the time-invariant components of unobserved heterogeneity.
I assume that exactly one wage offer is received in each period. Therefore unemployment
is treated as voluntary in this model. The home alternative thus includes individuals who
received wage offers below their reservation wage, and for whom schooling was similarly
unattractive compared to home production. When earnings are observed, they are denoted
by wit, and the difference between the log of observed earnings ln(wit) and W it is defined as
η˜it = ln(wit)−W it. (2.6)
Individuals cannot perfectly foresee the tuition charges and unemployment rates they will
face over their lifetime in their state of residence. Instead I assume they make forecasts of
these variables based on estimates of a state-specific AR(1) model. More specifically, in order
to predict tuition at 4-year instituions in their (U.S.) state, agents are assumed to know the
estimated coefficients from a regression of the logarithm of current (real median in-state 4-
year) tuition on its lagged value, for a sample covering the years 1978 to 2004. Thus I assign
each individual the constant, slope coefficient, and standard deviation that was estimated for
their state of residence, and assume that individuals know and use these parameters to predict
the following period’s tuition given its current value. I followed an equivalent procedure for
tuition at 2-year colleges and for the state-level unemployment rate. It is therefore assumed
that individuals characterize the movement of tuition levels and unemployment rates as AR(1)
processes, which they use in forecasting their future values conditional on current realizations.
Agents know their preferences as well as the stochastic process determining wage offers.
At time t, but no earlier, they also observe the transitory components of their utilities prior to
making their choice. The choice is probabilistic from our perspective because these transitory
components are not observed in the data. I begin by deriving the choice probability for an
individual whose earnings wit = exp{W it + η˜it} are observed.
A young man with the choice between home, work, and high school would choose the work
12
alternative if both Vit2 > Vit3 and Vit2 > Vit1, or if
ε1it = uit3 − uit2 ≤ V t2(Sit,mi) + β0wit − V t3(Sit,mi) ≡ ε∗1t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
and
ε2it = −uit2 ≤ V t2(Sit,mi) + β0wit − V t1(Sit,mi) ≡ ε∗2t(Sit,mi, η˜it).
where V tk(Sit,mi) is the nonstochastic component of Vtk(Sit,mi) for an individual with the
unobserved permanent traits of group mi. Thus conditional on the the time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity components, and given earnings wit the probability of choosing work is
given by
P ∗it2(mi) = Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ2
, ρ12
)
, (2.7)
where σ21 = σ2u2 + σ
2
u3 − 2σu2u3 , σ22 = σ2u2 and ρ12 =
σ2u2−σu2u3
σ1σ2
. When earnings are not
observed, we need to integrate over potential earnings.
Pit2(mi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit,mi, ηit)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit,mi, ηit)
σ2
, ρ12
)
φ
(
ηit
ση
)
dηit. (2.8)
The probabilities of choosing home and schooling can be defined similarly. For example, the
home alternative will be chosen if
ε3it = uit2 ≤ V t3(Sit,mi)− V t2(Sit,mi)− β0wit ≡ ε∗3t(Sit,mi, ηit)
and
ε2it = uit3 ≤ V t3(Sit,mi)− V t1(Sit,mi) ≡ ε∗4t(Sit,mi).
Thus the probability of making this choice is given by
Pit1(mi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ε∗3t(Sit,mi, ηit)
σu2
,
ε∗4t(Sit,mi, ηit)
σu3
, ρu2u3
)
,φ
(
ηit
ση
)
dηit,
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where ρu2u3 =
σu2u3
σ3σ4
.
2.3 Contributions to the Likelihood
These probabilities form the basis of the sample likelihood function. Setting observed
earnings aside for the moment, we can write the period-t likelihood contribution of individual
i, who shares the preferences of group m, as Pit(m) =
∑K
k=1 yitkPitk(m). Across all τi periods
for which the individual is observed in the data, we have Pi(m) =
∏τi
t=1 Pit(m). With each
individual’s type being unobserved, we take a weighted average of type-specific contributions,
Pi =
∑M
m=1 pimPi(m), where pim is the estimated share of group m in the population. Finally,
the sample likelihood for a sample of I individuals is the product of individuals’ contributions,
P =
∏I
i=1 Pi. The log-likelihood is then given by
l = lnP = ln
I∏
i=1
Pi =
I∑
i=1
ln(
M∑
m=1
pim
τi∏
t=1
K∑
k=0
yitkPitk(m)). (2.9)
Estimates are chosen to maximize the likelihood of observing the choices made by the
agents in the sample. The likelihood function is successively evaluated at candidate sets
of parameter values. Convergence is considered to be achieved when improvement in the
function declines below a chosen level of accuracy. The algorithm for updating parameters
between iterations and obtaining standard errors at the optimum follows Berndt, Hall, Hall
and Hausman (1974). Specifically, the standard errors are given by the square roots of the
diagonal elements of the inverse of a matrix formed by cumulating the outer product of the
score vector over individuals.
When earnings are recorded, the likelihood contribution will be the joint probability of
working and having earnings wit. With η˜it defined as the difference between observed log
earnings and those predicted by the deterministic part of the log earnings equation, the
likelihood contribution for an individual from group mi then consists of the product of a
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normalized wage density and the probability of working conditional on this wage draw3:
Pit0(mi) =
1
ση
φ
(
η˜it
ση
)
Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ2
, ρ12
)
. (2.10)
2.4 Bayesian Updating
While individuals observe general labor market conditions in each period, and know the
process generating wage offers, they do not know, ex ante, how well they will do individually
in this market given their educational background. Over time, however, while out of school,
individuals learn about the match between their skills and the current labor market. Persons
finding the market unfavorable may withdraw from it and decide to return to school in the
hope of receiving a more favorable match with a higher level of education.
I assume that there are two possible match qualities, θ = θL, θH . These qualities are
specific to the person’s education level. That is to say, the match quality will remain the
same as long as the individual does not obtain additional schooling. Individuals with a
good match face a different intercept αH1 and schooling coefficient αH2 in the wage equation.
With match quality being unobserved and varying across individuals, the wage error becomes
heteroskedastic, with the variance of wages differing by the level of education. The individuals
are aware that the difference exists, but do not know immediately whether they are in a good
match or not. They do not observe the ‘boost’ to mean earnings, if any, separately from
the transitory wage error, ηit. An individual who has just left school holds the initial belief
that he has a good match with probability q0. This belief is on average correct; that is, it
corresponds to the available proportion of good matches. This proportion may vary by the
level of education, and it also responds to the condition of the labor market in the state of
residence. It is specified as
q0 = (1 + eγ2+γ3Eit+γ4URit)−1. (2.11)
It is assumed that individuals use the wage offers they receive to infer the quality of their
3To distinguish workers with unobserved and observed earnings I let yit2 = 1 for the former case and
yit0 = 1 for the latter.
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current match with the labor market. This inference improves over time as long as individuals
are out of school. The ‘update,’ that is, the factor by which the prior probability qt−1
is multiplied, is given by the ratio of the wage density for a good match to the weighted
average of the wage densities for both match qualities, all evaluated at η˜it. Thus the updated
probability of having a good match is given by
qt = qt−1
φ
(
η˜it−αH1 −αH2 Eit
ση
)
qt−1φ
(
η˜it−αH1 −αH2 Eit
ση
)
+ (1− qt−1)φ
(
η˜it
ση
) . (2.12)
Learning about match quality implies that the probability of a good match now becomes
an additional state variable. This means that the state vector S, on which the expected value
function EtVt+1 (defined earlier) is conditioned, now includes the prior probability qt−1. With
learning, we also need to modify an individual’s period-specific likelihood function. We now
have a mixture over two contributions, with the prior probabilities qt−1 and (1−qt−1) serving
as weights. For a worker with observed wages this contribution is
Pit0(mi) = P (yit2 = 1, η˜it|mi) (2.13)
= Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit,mi, η˜it)
σ2
, ρ12
)
× 1
ση
(
qi,t−1φ
(
η˜it − αH1 − αH2 Eit
ση
)
+ (1− qi,t−1)φ
(
η˜it
ση
))
For individuals who did not choose work, and for a small number of workers whose earnings
are not observed, we need to ‘integrate out’ over the unobserved wage offers. The probability
of choosing work when wages are not observed is then computed as
Pit2(mi)
= qi,t−1
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit, ηit,mi)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit, ηit,mi)
σ2
, ρ34
)
φ
(
ηit|θH
ση
)
dηit
+(1− qi,t−1)
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ε∗1t(Sit, ηit,mi)
σ1
,
ε∗2t(Sit, ηit,mi)
σ2
, ρ34
)
φ
(
ηit|θL
ση
)
dηit.
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2.5 Interpolation
The probability qt affects the wages expected for future periods. Similarly, the current
values in tuition and unemployment rates, as well as the coefficients used to forecast their
future values, help determine the future attractiveness of the available options. With the
introduction of such continuous state variables an exact evaluation of future utilities for every
possible state vector Sit+1 becomes impossible. However, we are able to approximate these
future utilities by interpolation (Keane and Wolpin 1994). To do this, we select a subset of
state space points for evaluation. We then compute the expected value function values (i.e.
quantities like (2.1)) at those points, and regress these on the state variables themselves as
well as interactions between them4. Having obtained coefficient estimates from this regression
we can interpolate the value function at every possible state vector value.
Specifically, for each of the M = 3 permanent heterogeneity groups, for both having and
not having worked in the previous period, and for both ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ individuals,
I draw 250 state vectors, for a total of 3000 observations to be used in an age-specific in-
terpolation regression. The ranges of the state variables are chosen to mimic those observed
in the data. Within these ranges, the values are randomly chosen by transforming draws
from the uniform U [0, 1] distribution. The 17 variables assigned randomly are the current
values, constants, slope coefficients, and standard deviations for both tuition variables and
the unemployment rate (for a total of 12 variables), the prior probability of being in a good
match, as well as the years of (1) general schooling, (2) 2-year college education, (3) work
experience, and (4) years since last leaving school. For each of these 3000 observations, the
expected maximum over the alternative-specific value functions is simulated with 60 draws
from a vector of shocks to utility, earnings, both kinds of tuition and the unemployment rate.
The simulated Et maxk Vt+1,k becomes the dependent variable in the interpolation regression.
The state variables, transformations of them (for example, indicator variables for having at-
tended 12 and 16 years of education), and interaction terms then combine for a total of 58
4Keane and Wolpin (1994) suggest the differences between the choice-specific value functions and the
maximum over these, as well as the square root of these differences, as regressors in the interpolation regression.
I follow the approach taken by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), where the interpolation regression function
is a polynomial in the state variables themselves.
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regressors.
2.6 Simulation of Choice Probabilities
Probit models for more than two choices require approximations to the multivariate cu-
mulative normal distribution. These approximations become less accurate as the number of
choices increases. A commonly employed alternative approach, and the one pursued here,
is to use simulation to compute these multivariate probabilities. The most popular simula-
tion algorithm for multinomial probit models was developed by Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and
Keane (GHK), as reported in Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994). A detailed description of
the implementation of this algorithm is given in Train (2003). The key insight is that a joint
probability like (2.7) can be written as the product of conditional probabilities defined on
uncorrelated normal variates. The first step is to specify the distribution of the relevant error
differences. I will again first describe the process when there are only three options, and then
extend it to four options.
For the first alternative (‘home’), the covariance of the transitory shocks is summarized
by the 2× 2 matrix
Ω =
 1 σu2u3
σu2u3 σ
2
u3

For this matrix, the Cholesky factor L1, where L1L′1 = Ω, is a 0
b c
 =
 1 0
σu2u3 (σ2u3 − (σ2u2u3))0.5

We can then transform the correlated errors uitk into functions of uncorrelated standard
normal errors,  uit2
uit3
 = L1
 z1it
z2it
 =
 a 0
b c

 z1it
z2it
 .
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For a given wage draw, ηit, the probability of choosing the home alternative is
Pit1(m, ηit) = P (uit2 ≤ V t1(Sit,m)− V t2(Sit,m)− β0 exp{W it + ηit},
uit3 ≤ V t1(Sit,m)− V t3(Sit,m))
≡ P (uit2 ≤ V 12, uit3 ≤ V 13)
= P (az1it ≤ V 12)× P (cz2it ≤ V 13 − bz1it | az1it ≤ V 12)
= Φ(
V 12
a
)
∫ V 12/a
−∞
Φ(
V 13 − bz1it
c
)φ(z2it) dz2it.
The integral in this expression is simulated by taking repeated draws of pseudo-random num-
bers z2it from the standard normal distribtution truncated at V 12/a, computing the proba-
bility inside the integral, and taking an average across draws. The result is then multiplied
by the first probability Φ(V 12a ). The algorithm applies to a given wage draw ηit. As the wage
error is unobserved, several draws are taken from the distribution of wages, and the procedure
is repeated for each of them. Finally an average is taken across wage draws, and this average
represents the simulated probability of choosing the home alternative. In my implementation
of this procedure I use 20 draws of z2it for each individual and, where necessary, 40 draws of
the wage shock ηit.
The distribution of the error differences will differ between the K options, but they all must
be consistent with each other. To ensure this, all distributions are specified with reference to
the same matrix Ω. Adding a column of zeros to the left, and row of zeros at the top of Ω
yields Ωˆ:
Ωˆ =

0 0 0
0 1 σu2u3
0 σu2u3 σ2u3

The covariance matrix Ωk of the error differences for option k can then be obtained from Ωˆ.
First a ‘selector matrix’ Sk is created by a inserting a column of −1′s as the k-th column of
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a (K − 1)× (K − 1) identity matrix. For instance, with K=3 and k=2, this matrix is
S2 =
 1 −1 0
0 −1 1

Ωk is computed as Ωk = SkΩˆS′k. The coefficients of the Cholesky factor of Ωk can then be
used to simulate the probability of choosing k in the same way as the coefficients a, b, and
c in the algorithm outlined above are used to simulate the probability of choosing the home
alternative.
The covariance structure changes when the choice set is enlarged to four choices. Again,
taking the first alternative (‘home’) as an example, the covariance of the transitory shocks is
summarized by the 3× 3 matrix
Ω =

1 σu2u4 σu2u5
σu2u4 σ
2
u4 σu4u5
σu2u5 σu4u5 σ
2
u5

Again, the Cholesky factor L1 such that L1L′1 = Ω is computed:
L1 =

d 0 0
e f 0
g h i

We can then transform the correlated errors uitk into functions of uncorrelated standard
normal errors, 
uit2
uit4
uit4
 = L1

z1it
z2it
z3it
 =

d 0 0
e f 0
g h i


z1it
z2it
z3it
 ,
and write the joint probability of satisfying the relevant inequalities as the product of condi-
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tional probabilities:
Pit1(m) = P (uit2 ≤ V t1(Sit,m)− V t2(Sit,m)− β0 exp{W it + ηit},
uit4 ≤ V t1(Sit,m)− V t4(Sit,m),
uit5 ≤ V t1(Sit,m)− V t5(Sit,m))
≡ P (uit2 ≤ V 12, uit4 ≤ V 14, uit5 ≤ V 15)
= P (dz1it ≤ V 12)
× P (fz2it ≤ V 14 − ez1it | dz1it ≤ V 12)
× P (iz3it ≤ V 13 − gz1it − hz2it | dz1it ≤ V 12, fz2it ≤ V 14 − ez1it)
= Φ(
V 12
d
)
×
∫ V 12/d
z2it=−∞
Φ(
V 14 − ez1it
f
)
×
∫ V 14−ez1it
f
z3it=−∞
Φ(
V 15 − gz1it − hz2it
i
)φ(z3it)φ(z2it) dz3it dz2it.
Similar probabilities are computed for the other options, each with its own Cholesky factor
derived from the same underlying covariance matrix.
21
Chapter 3
Data
I obtain information on personal characteristics and choices from the National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The survey interviewed its subjects annually from 1979
through 1994 and biennially thereafter.
My goal was to define a single primary activity (work, school, home) for each individ-
ual reaching back to their 16th birthday. Using retrospective data contained in the survey
allowed me to include individuals born as early as August 1961. In a similar vein, I used
the information reported in the post-1994 biennial interviews to construct annual activities
through 2004, which is the most recent interview year on which data is publicly available.
3.1 School Enrollment
The earliest readily available school enrollment variable in the NLSY79 is the enrollment
status as of May 1, 1979. However, it is possible to construct a school enrollment variable for
the year prior to that because individuals reported a fair amount of retrospective information
in their initial 1979 interview. I began by defining school enrollment in 1979 using the indi-
vidual’s enrollment status as of May 1, 1979 (NLSY79 Variable R02166.01). I then assigned
a positive school enrollment status for 1978 for individuals enrolled at some point between
March 1978 and May 1979 if they were too young to drop out before May 1978. Given the
school attendance laws prevailing in most states at the time, this meant they had to be born
in or after May 1962. This cutoff could be relaxed by one year for states with compulsory
school attendance until the 17th birthday (ME, NV, NM, PA, TX, VA), and by two years for
states with compulsory school attendance through age 18 (HI, OH, OK, OR, UT, WA).
In addition, individuals enrolled at some point between March 1978 and May 1979 were
considered to have attended school in 1978 if they met a highest-grade-completed (hgc) test
for their birth cohort as of May 1, 1979. The rationale went as follows. Individuals born in
September 1961 or later were too young to start first grade in 1967 in the vast majority of
states. If they started school in 1968 and did not repeat any grade they would have completed
tenth grade in 1978, which would be reflected in the highest grade completed as of May 1 1979
(recorded in R00173.00 and/or R02167.01). Similarly, those born in September 1960 or later
would have completed the eleventh grade in 1978. Allowing for one grade repetition relaxed
this hgc-test by one year. I opted for this latter, more permissive interpretation because it
helps smooth out the series of enrollment rates by birthyear. I also assigned a positive 1978
enrollment status for persons who graduated from high school in 1977 (R00183.00) but had
completed 13 years of schooling by May 1, 1979, with equivalent cutoffs for earlier graduating
years.
All the individuals defined as enrolled in 1978 according to the criteria just discussed
were also considered ‘observed without gap,’ meaning that we know their primary activity
for every year since their 16th birthday. Regardless of their 1978 enrollment status, I also
considered individuals to be observed without gap if they were too young to have left school
by May 1977. Again, “too young” was defined by birthday cutoffs which varied by state. For
those old enough to have dropped out, but who last enrolled between April 1977 and March
1978 (inclusive), I defined another hgc-test equivalent to that described above, but relaxed
by one year. Persons meeting that hgc-test were then also considered to be observed without
a gap in their choice history. Across all birth-years, the coding described above left me with
4558 young men who were observed without gap, and 1845 who were not. Beginning with
a sample containing only the youngest individuals, I successively decreased the birth-year
cutoff, observing the fraction of individuals with gaps in their choice history. This fraction is
nil for the youngest (born in 1964), and increases monotonically as the birthyear is reduced,
crossing the treshold of 0.05 among men born in 1961. I then varied the birth-month cutoff
for that year, and thus established an inclusion criterion of being born after July 1961. This
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left 2605 individuals, 46 of whom still showed gaps and were therefore deleted as well. I also
deleted 105 individuals who appeared to be out of school in violation of the mandatory school
attendance law for their state.
Further, a few individuals had an improbably low ‘highest grade completed’ as of 1978.
This latter variable, the highest grade completed as of 1978, was imputed by subtracting
the indicator for school attendance in 1978 from the highest grade attended as of 1979
(R02167.01). Thus, to remain in the sample, men born in or after May 1964 had to have
completed 5 years of schooling, those born between May 1963 and April 1964 required 6 years,
those born between May 1962 and April 1963 7 years, and those born before May 1962 needed
8 years. This led to the deletion of 46 more individuals, with 2408 remaining in the sample.
School enrollment variables for the years 1980 through 1994 were again based on the
enrollment status as of May 1 of the survey year, as was the case for 1979 (already noted
above). For the years after 1994, I assigned a school enrollment status of 0 if the individual
declared having not been enrolled since the last interview, or was not interviewed and declared
at the subsequent interview having not been enrolled since the last interview. I further
assigned an enrollment status of 1 if the individual was in school either in all of the four
months of September, October, March and April, or was enrolled in May, assigning a status
of zero for the complement. For the even (interview) years, this was overridden by the available
May 1 enrollment status. For these years we have one more source of information. Individuals
not interviewed in year t may report in their interview in year t+2 that they were enrolled in
either March and April or in May of year t. In this case they were also considered enrolled
for the entire school year ending in year t. This criterion deviates from that defined earlier
because recollections in year t+2 are only recorded as far back as January of year t. For this
reason I could not require them to have been enrolled in September and October of year t-1
as well as March and April of year t.
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3.2 Two-year Colleges
For a number of survey years, the NLSY provides information on the type of college last
attended, and in some cases for two additional colleges. For most of the early survey years the
college type is not recorded if the most recent college remained the same between interviews.
Beginning with the 1998 survey year the college type is recorded even if the college had been
recorded previously; this interviewing policy had also been in place briefly for the 1984 survey
year. In 1987 and 1991 the questions about college type and dates of enrollment at colleges
were not asked at all. Further, no surveys took place in the odd years after 1994.
I adopted the following conventions for the college type variable. For most of the years
prior to 1994 I was able to use the type of the college last attended, but things were less
straightforward for the years in which these variables were not available. For the years
1987, 1988 and from 1992 onward, the college type in year t was taken to be that reported,
provided the person had first enrolled at that college the year before and last enrolled there
in the current year or later. Further, for the years 1987, 1988 and 1992 to 1996, if the person
indicated having been enrolled at the same college as in the most recent previous even year or
earlier, then that year’s college type was substituted, provided that the student last enrolled
there in the current year or later.
I was not able to assign a college type for every individual enrolling at school after accu-
mulating 12 years of education. This was the case for 561 person-years. Conversely, though,
there were also 73 person-years who did indicate a college type even though they had not yet
attended twelve years of education. In each of these two scenarios, an individual’s person-
years occuring prior to the problem case were retained, but those occuring after were lost.
Altogether these deletions then led to a sample containing 37,449 (instead of 42,180) person-
years.
3.3 Work Choices
From the weekly work history arrays, available going back to January 1978, I constructed
the number of weeks in the year spent in each of the four categories of “no information,”
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“not working,” “employed,” and “military.” For the years 1978 through 1993, I assigned
individuals to the activity of “work” if they were not in school in the sense already described
and employed more than half the year according to both of two conditions: their number of
weeks employed had to exceed 26, and their annual hours worked had to exceed 1000. They
were considered to be engaged in “home production” if they were not in school and failed
one or both of the ‘more-than-half-time’ work conditions. For the years 1994 and onward,
annual hours are not available for the odd years. I replaced the two work conditions by a
single condition of having worked more than 26 weeks. Individuals with positive weeks in
the military were dropped from the point of enlistment onward. I further deleted person-
years from that point onward where no assignment to one of the three primary activities had
been made, even if such an assignment was possible for later years. This was predicated on
the transition laws of the years of education and years of work experience, two crucial state
variables in the model.
By construction, agents younger than 16 do not choose their primary activity; these
person-years are excluded from the sample. For the year 1978, for example, this meant that
persons born after April 1962 would not be used in the estimation until (at least) 1979. In
states with compulsory attendance through age 17 even 16-year-olds cannot be considered
to be choosing their activity, nor do 17-year-olds in states that compell attendance until the
18th birthday. Therefore these person-years were also excluded from the sample. With these
adjustments we observe 2313 individuals for 1-26 years, for a total of 32,718 person-years.
3.4 Earnings and Tuition
In order to create an earnings variable, I divided the individual’s reported annual earnings
by annual work hours. This was multiplied by 2000 to generate a full-time equivalent income.
In the estimation earnings are thus treated as missing when either of the annual measures
were not reported, but the observation remains part of the sample. Information on state-level
average tuition was obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) for the years 1980, 1984 to 1998, and 2000 to 2004, and from the Higher Education
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General Information Survey (HEGIS) for the years 1978 and 1983. The 4-year tuition rate
applicable to an individual was given by the median undergraduate tuition for all public 4-
year colleges or universities in the state of residence at age 14. The 2-year tuition variable
was defined analogously. The lack of a consistent measure of financial aid for large parts of
the sample precludes the measurement of net tuition. Tuition figures used in this study are to
be taken as ‘gross’ or ‘sticker price’ tuition. For the years in which no tuiton measures were
available from the two sources mentioned (1979, 1981, 1982, and 1999) I imputed tuition by
linear interpolation. Both earnings and tuition were deflated using the Consumer Price Index
for May of the relevant year, and as a result are measured in 2004 dollars.
3.5 Sample Overview
A summary of the annual activity proportions in the sample used for estimation is given
in Table 3.1. As is shown there, the proportion working full-time increases monotonically
from a low of 2.5% at age 16 to 88.44% at age 35, and remains at roughly that level until age
39.
Full-time school enrollment when fewer than 12 years have been previously attended will
be referred to as “high school attendance.” This activity begins at its high of 93.8% at age 16
and falls below 1% by age 20. Two things are worth noting about the high school series. The
fraction enrolled at age 16 only represents the proportion of those who have a legal choice
about enrolling. As noted, those individuals who are required by state law to attend until
age 17 or 18 are not represented in the sample until they reach that age. Second, it is highly
unlikely that 0.21% of 37-year-olds are enrolled in high school. These apparent late bloomers
reflect observations on individuals who enroll in their eleventh or twelfth year of schooling at
these later ages, and do not indicate being enrolled in one or the other college type at that
time. Enrollment in 4-year colleges and universities peaks at age 21, and declines thereafter,
but does not drop below 1% until age 35. Enrollment at 2-year colleges peaks even earlier,
at age 19, when 10.9% choose this option. The final option, labeled ’out-of-the-labor-force’
(OLF) includes individuals who were employed for less than half of the year. This proportion
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Table 3.1: Activity Proportions in Data, by Age
High 4-year 2-year
Ages N Work School College College OLF
All (16-41) 32718 .6277 .1456 .0727 .0237 .1302
16 1742 .0247 .938 0 0 .0373
17 2059 .0578 .8679 .0019 .001 .0714
18 2068 .1673 .5561 .0895 .044 .1431
19 1862 .369 .0806 .217 .109 .2245
20 1756 .4761 .0046 .2221 .0871 .2101
21 1702 .5452 .0024 .2274 .0517 .1733
22 1631 .6137 .0031 .1882 .0319 .1631
23 1548 .7132 .0013 .1189 .0233 .1434
24 1482 .7726 .0047 .0769 .0182 .1275
25 1428 .8039 .0021 .063 .0126 .1183
26 1354 .8102 .0007 .051 .0192 .1189
27 1263 .8131 .0016 .0435 .015 .1267
28 1176 .8206 .0017 .0408 .0085 .1284
29 1118 .8301 .0018 .0268 .0089 .1324
30 1093 .8435 .0009 .021 .0064 .1281
31 1062 .8512 .0009 .0188 .0085 .1205
32 1038 .8661 0 .0164 .0048 .1127
33 1024 .8682 .002 .0127 .0029 .1143
34 1014 .8797 0 .0118 .003 .1055
35 995 .8844 .001 .006 .004 .1045
36 970 .8773 0 .0062 .001 .1155
37 938 .8795 .0021 .0053 .0032 .1098
38 923 .8884 0 .0033 .0011 .1073
39 762 .8766 0 .0026 .0026 .1181
40 493 .8621 0 .0081 .0041 .1258
41 217 .8618 0 .0138 .0046 .1198
reaches a high of 22.45% at age 19, and declines below 14% by age 24.
As Table 3.2 shows, there is a great degree of persistence in choices from year to year. For
all ages taken together, the transition rates shown in the diagonal elements in the table, which
reflect the proportions remaining in their primary activity from one year to the next, are the
largest within their rows and columns. For 16- to 22-year-old men working in a given year,
about five in six will also be working in the next year, and this persistence is even greater for
the older age group. A similar proportion of younger men who enrolled in a 4-year college or
university will also be found in that activity in the following year.
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Table 3.2: Transition Rates in Data
Activity at t
Ages Activity at t− 1 N Work HS 4-year 2-year OLF
16-22 Work 2839 .844 .004 .018 .020 .114
16-22 High School 6642 .111 .706 .064 .035 .084
16-22 4-Year College 1337 .129 . .817 .019 .035
16-22 2-Year College 507 .306 . .144 .487 .063
16-22 OLF 1495 .334 .025 .023 .020 .597
23-41 Work 16352 .931 .001 .009 .005 .055
23-41 High School 26 .577 .077 . . .346
23-41 4-Year College 955 .416 . .537 .012 .036
23-41 2-Year College 224 .473 . .067 .415 .045
23-41 OLF 2341 .36 .006 .009 .004 .622
All (16-41) Work 19191 .918 .001 .011 .007 .064
All (16-41) High School 6668 .113 .703 .064 .034 .085
All (16-41) 4-Year College 2292 .249 . .700 .016 .035
All (16-41) 2-Year College 731 .357 . .120 .465 .057
All (16-41) OLF 3836 .350 .013 .014 .010 .612
Individuals are less likely to re-enroll at later ages. About 2% of young men enroll in
4-year and 2-year colleges, respectively, after working full-time the previous year, and similar
proportions return to school from outside the labor force. Among men of ages 23 to 41, about
1% will resume their education after an absence at a 4-year college, and about 0.5% do so at
a 2-year college. Direct transfers from a 2-year to a 4-year college are much more likely than
transfers in the opposite direction. For all ages taken together, about 12% of men studying
at community colleges students will enroll in a 4-year college or university in the , but less
than 2% do the reverse.
Tables 3.3 to 3.6 provide an indication of the prevalence of leaving and returning to
school in the data. 1968 individuals are observed leaving school at most once (Table 3.3),
while 345 are observed leaving school multiple times. For those leaving school only once,
Table 3.4 shows the frequency counts for the six possible transitions from schooling into non-
schooling states. The greatest frequencies here occur for individuals who leave during or after
high school for either full-time work or part-time work/home production, with a substantial
minority (of about 42%) making the latter transition. This is much less common for those
leaving postsecondary education, where 87% and 86% immediately transition into full-time
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Table 3.3: Number of Times Observed Leaving School
Times Leaving School Individuals Proportion
0 484 20.93
1 1484 64.16
2 266 11.50
3 60 2.59
4 16 0.69
5 2 0.09
6 1 0.04
Total 2,313 100.00
Table 3.4: Transitions for Individuals Leaving School Once
Activity at t
Activity at t− 1 Work OLF Total
High School 624 448 1072
4-year College 260 38 298
2-year College 98 16 114
Total 982 502 1484
employment.
As Table 3.5 shows, 1925 persons are never observed returning to school, while 388 return
at least once, for a total of 506 re-enrollment spells. For the people who return, Table 3.6
gives an idea of the relative importance of the three schooling types among the re-enrollment
spells. 65 persons return to high school after an absence, and 9 do so multiple times. 187 or
about 48% of any first re-enrollment spell occurs in order to attend a 4-year college, and 64%
of later re-enrollment spells occur at such institutions. As for the pre-return activities, there
is a significant difference between first and later re-enrollment, as 130 or about one third of all
Table 3.5: Number of Times Observed Returning to School
Times Returning to School Individuals Proportion
0 1925 83.23
1 294 12.71
2 74 3.20
3 17 0.73
4 2 0.09
5 1 0.04
Total 2,313 100.00
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Table 3.6: Transitions if Returning to School
First Return
Activity at t
Activity at t− 1 High School 4-year College 2-year College Total
Work 20 138 100 258
OLF 45 49 36 130
Total 65 187 136 388
Later Returns
Activity at t
Activity at t− 1 High School 4-year College 2-year College Total
Work 3 69 31 103
OLF 6 6 3 15
Total 9 75 34 118
first re-enrollment spells commence after part-time work/home production, while only 13%
(15/118) of later spells come from that source.
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Chapter 4
Estimates
Parameter estimates and their asymptotic standard errors are presented in Table 4.1.
The signs of most coefficients in the wage equation1 accord with commonly held priors. For
example, years of work experience raise earnings at a decreasing rate. The return to work
experience starts just below 10% for the first year, and declines from there. According to
these estimates, the earnings-experience profile reaches a maximum around 16 years of work
experience (− α32α4 = 16).
Good matches receive a boost equal to αH1 +αH2 Eit. At 12 years of schooling, this amounts
to a boost of 66% of earnings, and at 16 years of schooling it stands at about 61%. The pro-
portion of available good matches, q0, appears to not vary systemically with the level of
education and the unemployment rate when entering the labor market. These two coeffi-
cients, γ3 and γ4, while implying economically meaningful effects, are imprecisely estimated.
Given the coefficients, the availability of a good match with 16 years of education and at an
unemployment rate of 5% is (1+ exp{.296+1.9315(0.05)− .0148(16)})−1 = 0.46. In addition
to reducing the fraction of good matches, an increase in unemployment also directly reduces
wages, with an average loss of about 2.3% per percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate.
The coefficient on the indicator variable for having 12 or more years of schooling is large
and negative, likely reflecting problems with treating all individuals who have attended 12
years of schooling identically, regardless of whether they graduated from high school. By
contrast, I find a large and positive premium for 16 or more years of education (about 51%).
1All dollar figures are in 2004 dollars. Monetary values (earnings and tuition) are measured in $10000.
Residual variation in the log of annual earnings is estimated to be quite high, with an es-
timated standard deviation of 0.49. All else equal, an incremental year of schooling raises
wage offers by 4.5%. A year of education at a community college adds less than that, but
the difference (α8 = −.0085) is very imprecisely estimated. Relative to the exluded group of
‘whites,’ and all else equal, other racial groups receive wage offers that are about 18% lower.
The estimate of the marginal utility of consumption is positive and highly significant.
Relative to the utility of home production, the nonpecuniary utility associated with working
increases steeply until reaching the age range 28-32 after which it flattens out, and finally
falls somewhat at higher ages. While the utility of attending high school drops after age 18,
the nonpecuniary component of the utility associated with attending 4-year colleges rises at
age 20, but generally falls with age. The utility associated with attending a 2-year college
is highest below age 20, and falls prior to rebounding eventually. Relative to ‘whites,’ other
groups have a greater disutility of working, and higher consumption values of high school and
community college education.
The proportions for the three heterogeneity groups are given by
pi1 = (1 + exp{.617})−1 = 0.35,
pi2 = (1 + exp{.258})−1(1− pi1) = .28, and
pi3 = 1− pi1 − pi2 = .37
Conditional on years since leaving school and on work status in the previous year, group 2
has a greater preference for work (β21(2) > 0) and 2-year college (β51(2) > 0) than group
1 (the default), while the reverse is true for high school and 4-year college. Group 2 also
faces lower wage offers than group 1 (α12(2) < 0). Group 3 receives the highest wage offers
among the three. It also has the greatest preference for work, high school, and 2-year college.
For all three groups, recent time away from school reduces the disutility of work (β22 > 0,
β22 + β22(2) > 0, and β22 + β22(3) > 0), and reduces the consumption value of all 3 schooling
choices. For the most part, having worked the year before makes work now less onerous, and
schooling less attractive, with the exception of 4-year college for group 2, and 2-year college
33
for group 1.
As discussed in chapter 3 and shown in Table 4.2, the choice patterns in the data reveal a
rapid transition from high school to college, employment and non-employment, followed by a
transition from college to employment. As shown in Table 4.3, the model is able to capture
the following main features in the data. First, the full-time employment rate increases rapidly
with age. Secondly, college attendance rates rise initially and then decline. Thirdly, the non-
school/non-employment rate increases initially, then declines, and finally stabilizes. However,
the Table also shows that the model has trouble fitting the observed choice patterns in the 16-
18 age range, underestimating the rate at which individuals attend high school at those ages.
This is likely to be related to the negative estimate on high school completion in the earnings
equation discussed earlier. The model also has some trouble in capturing the decline in college
attendance rates (and the associated increase in employment) with age. As indicated by the
chi-squared statistics in Table 4.3 the overall fit is not great, but given the large sample sizes
at each age interval as well as the well-known tendency of simple structural dynamic models
to be rejected by the data, this does not come as a great surprise.
The model’s fit of the data would likely improve with a more careful distinction between
high school and college grade attendance and grade completion, but this would generally
require a considerable expansion in the choice set and state variables in the model. It is not
obvious, though, that the model’s inability to capture these specific features in the activity-
age patterns in the data will lead to meaningful biases in the model’s implied estimates of
the effect of tuition and labor market conditions on choice behavior.
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Table 4.1: Parameter Estimates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
β0 Consumption .0211 .0020
Utility when working
β21 Constant -1.9355 .0497
β21(2) I[mi = 2] .1483 .0550
β21(3) I[mi = 3] .8937 .0675
β22 Years out of school .0151 .0021
β22(2) I[mi = 2] Years out of school -.0090 .0024
β22(3) I[mi = 3] Years out of school -.0054 .0035
β23 Work in previous period 1.7486 .0419
β23(2) I[mi = 2] Work in previous period -.4322 .0490
β23(3) I[mi = 3] Work in previous period -.6107 .0565
18 ≤ Age < 20 .3423 .0274
20 ≤ Age < 22 .5079 .0410
22 ≤ Age < 24 .6245 .0423
24 ≤ Age < 28 .7543 .0383
28 ≤ Age < 32 .6479 .0431
32 ≤ Age < 36 .6962 .0435
36 ≤ Age .5586 .0435
β24 indicated race other than ‘white’ -.1430 .0134
Utility when at high school
β31 Constant .4580 .0404
β31(2) I[mi = 2] -.4067 .0358
β31(3) I[mi = 3] 1.508 .0696
β32 Out of school last year -.3471 .0662
β32(2) I[mi = 2] Out of school last year .0514 .0614
β32(3) I[mi = 3] Out of school last year -.9906 .1073
β33 Work in previous period -.4201 .0568
β33(2) I[mi = 2] Work in previous period .2509 .0534
β33(3) I[mi = 3] Work in previous period -.6903 .0965
Age ≥ 19 -.2844 .0273
β34 indicated race other than ‘white’ .1163 .0106
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Table 4.1 (continued): Parameter Estimates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Utility when at 4-year college
β41 Constant .2334 .0326
β41(2) I[mi = 2] -.4872 .0486
β41(3) I[mi = 3] -.5128 .0544
β42 Years out of school -.0438 .0106
β42(2) I[mi = 2] Years out of school -.3406 .0603
β42(3) I[mi = 3] Years out of school -.0178 .0160
β43 Work in previous period -.1361 .0647
β43(2) I[mi = 2] Work in previous period .2574 .1194
β43(3) I[mi = 3] Work in previous period .0143 .0594
20 ≤ Age < 22 .1266 .0259
22 ≤ Age < 24 .1577 .0279
24 ≤ Age < 28 .1046 .0289
28 ≤ Age < 32 .0351 .0330
32 ≤ Age < 36 -.0236 .0389
36 ≤ Age .0742 .0295
β44 indicated race other than ‘white’ -.0204 .0155
Utility when at 2-year college
β51 Constant -.7684 .1283
β51(2) I[mi = 2] .0744 .0471
β51(3) I[mi = 3] .6627 .1070
β52 Years out of school -.3765 .3242
β52(2) I[mi = 2] Years out of school .3148 .3233
β52(3) I[mi = 3] Years out of school .2739 .3230
β53 Work in previous period .1716 .3441
β53(2) I[mi = 2] Work in previous period -.3068 .3479
β53(3) I[mi = 3] Work in previous period -.4621 .3456
20 ≤ Age < 22 -.0872 .0397
22 ≤ Age < 24 -.1993 .0560
24 ≤ Age < 28 -.0765 .0502
28 ≤ Age < 32 -.0504 .0570
32 ≤ Age < 36 -.1123 .0681
36 ≤ Age .2308 .0555
β54 indicated race other than ‘white’ .0870 .0296
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Table 4.1 (continued): Parameter Estimates
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Wage Offer Equation
α1 Constant -.0521 .0298
α1(2) Constant I[mi = 2] -.5809 .0116
α1(3) Constant I[mi = 3] .3447 .0099
α2 Years of Schooling .0452 .0021
α3 Years of Work Experience .0991 .0021
α4 Years of Work Experience squared -.0031 .0001
α5 Years at 2-year college -.0085 .0168
α6 Schooling ≥ 12 -.2561 .0116
α7 Schooling ≥ 16 .5064 .0138
α8 Current Unemployment Rate -2.2534 .2157
α9 indicated race other than ‘white’ -.1806 .0077
αH1 I[θ = θH ] .8146 .0267
αH2 I[θ = θH ] Years of Schooling -.0127 .0020
Heterogeneity
4-year College Utility Shock Cholesky coefficient 1 -.0361 .0387
4-year College Utility Shock Cholesky coefficient 2 -.3117 .0298
2-year College Utility Shock Cholesky coefficient 1 -.2790 .0772
2-year College Utility Shock Cholesky coefficient 2 .4044 .0713
2-year College Utility Shock Cholesky coefficient 3 .1865 .0686
High School Cholesky coefficient 1 -.2076 .0176
High School Cholesky coefficient 2 .0083 .0011
ση Std. Deviation of Wage Offers .4924 .0010
γ0 Constant in pi1 .6170 .0664
γ1 Constant in pi2 .2584 .0708
γ2 Constant in q0 .2960 .2277
γ3 Current Unemployment Rate in q0 1.9315 1.7196
γ4 Years of Schooling in q0 -.0148 .0121
δ Discount Factor .935 Fixed
Individuals 2313
Observations 32717
Log-likelihood -28552.3367
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Table 4.2: Activity Proportions in Data, by Age Group
Ages N Work School 4-year 2-year OLF
16-18 5869 .0866 .7788 .0322 .0158 .0866
19-21 5320 .4607 .0305 .2220 .0835 .2034
21-24 4661 .6973 .0030 .1298 .0247 .1453
25-27 4045 .8089 .0015 .0529 .0156 .1211
28-30 3387 .8311 .0015 .0298 .0080 .1296
31-33 3124 .8617 .0010 .0160 .0054 .1159
34-36 2979 .8805 .0003 .0081 .0027 .1084
37-39 2623 .8818 .0008 .0038 .0023 .1113
40-41 710 .8620 0 .0099 .0042 .1239
All (16-41) 32718 .6277 .1456 .0727 .0237 .1302
Table 4.3: Activity Proportions in Baseline Simulation, by Age Group
Ages N Work School 4-year 2-year OLF χ2 (Row)
16-18 5869 .2841 .6135 .0293 .0184 .0546 1181
19-21 5320 .4299 .1286 .2186 .0473 .1756 581
22-24 4661 .5901 .0696 .1535 .0308 .1560 414
25-27 4045 .7083 .0488 .0879 .0311 .1239 331
28-30 3387 .7331 .0374 .0656 .0286 .1352 279
31-33 3124 .7854 .0280 .0452 .0204 .1210 198
34-36 2979 .8035 .0251 .0383 .0263 .1068 229
37-39 2623 .7644 .0409 .0565 .0431 .0951 388
40-41 710 .7443 .0647 .0577 .0443 .0889 123
All (16-41) 32718 .5940 .1604 .0939 .0310 .1207 343
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Chapter 5
Policy Experiments
In this chapter I present the results of four sets of policy simulations. The first of these
concerns universal tuition subsidies, and a second set restricts these subsidies to particular
groups. Another group of experiments alters parameters in the wage equation, and a final set
is concerned with the effects of increases in the unemployment rate on choices.
5.1 Universal Tuition Subsidies
Table 5.1 compares the results of two universal tuition subsidies with the baseline simu-
lation. A $1000 reduction in tuition is shown to result in modest increases in the proportions
enrolled in high school and at 4-year colleges, in every age group, with smaller changes in the
proportions enrolled at 2-year colleges. The corresponding enrollment rates at the two college
types for ages 18 to 19, shown in Table 5.2, increase by 0.11 and 0.05 percentage points, or
about 0.16 percentage points for both college types combined. The share of 38-year-olds with
16 of more years of schooling is also shown to increase by 1.7 percentage points, or about 6%
of its level in the baseline simulation, which is in line with estimates of the effects of federal
aid and tuition on college enrollment and completion found in prior studies.
A complete elimination of tuition generates greater though still modest changes in be-
havior. Both work and the nonwork-nonschool alternative are chosen less frequently in every
age group, while all three kinds of schooling are chosen more often, also in every age group.
By age 38 an additional 2.15% have accumulated 16 of more years of schooling as a result
of eliminating tuition. By this measure ‘free’ postsecondary education achieves only about
Table 5.1: Simulated Activity Proportions, by Age Group
Ages Work School 4-year 2-year OLF
Baseline
16-20 .331 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .584 .071 .155 .033 .156
26-30 .727 .041 .073 .029 .129
31-35 .796 .026 .041 .020 .117
36-41 .766 .042 .054 .043 .095
All (16-41) .594 .160 .094 .031 .121
Tuition Reduced by $1000
16-20 .328 .437 .104 .031 .099
21-25 .581 .072 .158 .034 .156
26-30 .724 .042 .075 .030 .129
31-35 .793 .027 .043 .020 .116
36-41 .763 .042 .057 .044 .095
All (16-41) .591 .161 .096 .031 .120
Tuition Eliminated
16-20 .324 .440 .106 .033 .096
21-25 .573 .074 .164 .036 .153
26-30 .716 .044 .081 .032 .127
31-35 .787 .028 .048 .022 .115
36-41 .755 .043 .062 .048 .093
All (16-41) .585 .163 .100 .034 .118
Table 5.2: Effect on Educational Attainment
Experiment Enrollment Rate, Ages 18-19 Eit ≥ 16 by Age 38
4-year 2-year
Baseline .1398 .0420 .2881
Tuition Reduced by $1000 .1409 .0425 .3051
Tuition Eliminated .1439 .0456 .3096
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26% more than a $1000 subsidy. The persistent negative effect on the proportion engaged
in full-time work requires some explanation because we might expect the increased earnings
to draw individuals back into employment. Earnings do in fact increase in the free tuition
experiment1, but it appears that this effect is dominated by the high consumption value of
schooling and the high psychic cost of returning to it once an individual has left.
5.2 Targeted Subsidies
In contrast with such universal policies, incentives for additional schooling might be tar-
geted at older workers. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the results of two such subsidies. In two
separate experiments, tuition is eliminated for workers with at least 1 year of (full-time) work
experience, and for those who are at least 28 years of age. It is intructive to note that high
school enrollment, while already ‘free’, increases as a result of both of these policies, as the
option value of completing secondary education has now increased. By age 38, the policy
providing the subsidy conditional only on age has raised the ‘college completion rate’ by 1.24
percentage points, while the policy that explicitly requires work experience only raises that
rate by 0.68 percentage points.
5.3 Changes in Wage Offers
A further set of experiments was conducted that directly acted on the earnings offered to
individuals, the results of which are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. In one experiment wage
offers were increased by 10%. This wage subsidy encourages work at all ages, increasing the
time devoted to full-time work by about 1 percentage point across all ages at the expense of
all other activities. By age 38, the rate of BA degree completion is reduced from 28.8% to
28.1%. By contrast, this rate increases to 29.2% in an experiment that raises the wage of
college graduates by increasing α7 from .506 to .606. This kind of change raises the proportions
working at all ages, while schooling increases slightly at most age groups. The activity most
1Median Earnings at age 38 increase from $41,463 in the baseline simulation to $41,786 for those choosing
work, and median offers to those who end up choosing to remain at a 4-year college or university at that age
increase from $37,090 to $38,659.
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Table 5.3: Simulated Activity Proportions, by Age Group
Ages Work School 4-year 2-year OLF
Baseline
16-20 .331 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .584 .071 .155 .033 .156
26-30 .727 .041 .073 .029 .129
31-35 .796 .026 .041 .020 .117
36-41 .766 .042 .054 .043 .095
All (16-41) .594 .160 .094 .031 .121
Tuition Eliminated After 1 Year of Work
16-20 .330 .437 .103 .031 .099
21-25 .582 .072 .156 .034 .155
26-30 .725 .042 .075 .031 .127
31-35 .794 .027 .043 .021 .115
36-41 .763 .042 .056 .046 .093
All (16-41) .592 .161 .095 .032 .119
Tuition Eliminated from Age 28 on
16-20 .326 .439 .105 .032 .099
21-25 .577 .073 .159 .035 .156
26-30 .719 .043 .079 .031 .128
31-35 .788 .028 .047 .022 .115
36-41 .757 .041 .062 .047 .093
All (16-41) .587 .162 .098 .033 .120
Table 5.4: Effect on Educational Attainment
Experiment Enrollment Rate, Ages 18-19 Eit ≥ 16 by Age 38
4-year 2-year
Baseline .1398 .0420 .2881
Tuition Eliminated if Xit ≥ 1 .1398 .0425 .2949
Tuition Eliminated if Age≥ 28 .1415 .0433 .3005
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Table 5.5: Simulated Activity Proportions, by Age Group
Ages Work School 4-year 2-year OLF
Baseline
16-20 .331 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .584 .071 .155 .033 .156
26-30 .727 .041 .073 .029 .129
31-35 .796 .026 .041 .020 .117
36-41 .766 .042 .054 .043 .095
All (16-41) .594 .160 .094 .031 .121
Wages Increased by 10% at All Ages
16-20 .337 .433 .102 .030 .098
21-25 .594 .069 .151 .033 .152
26-30 .739 .040 .068 .029 .125
31-35 .806 .026 .037 .020 .112
36-41 .775 .046 .047 .042 .091
All (16-41) .603 .159 .090 .030 .117
College Premium Raised by 10%
16-20 .331 .436 .104 .031 .098
21-25 .585 .071 .157 .034 .154
26-30 .729 .042 .073 .030 .126
31-35 .798 .028 .040 .020 .114
36-41 .767 .047 .050 .043 .092
All (16-41) .595 .162 .094 .031 .118
clearly discouraged in both cases is the non-work, non-employment option, which decreases
for every age group.
5.4 Changes in Labor Market Conditions
The final set of experiments contrasts the results of a single-period increase in the un-
employment rate with those of a longer-term recession. Specifically, in the first experiment,
the local unemployment rate is increased by 2 percentage points for every individual at age
21. At that time, agents will update their forecasts of future unemployment rates, and make
their choices in light of those forecasts. In the next year, the local unemployment rate is no
longer augmented, and agents’ expectations of future unemployment rates will be identical to
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Table 5.6: Effect on Educational Attainment
Experiment Enrollment Rate, Ages 18-19 Eit ≥ 16 by Age 38
4-year 2-year
Baseline .1398 .0420 .2881
Wages Increased by 10% at All Ages .1384 .0418 .2810
College Premium Raised by 10% .1407 .0421 .2920
the forecasts agents used in the baseline simulation. In the second experiment, the increase
in the unemployment rate above the rates found in the data lasts for ten periods, and thus
continues through to age 30.
Even the single-period increase in the unemployment rate has effects on behavior for
several years. The proportion choosing work, for example, is reduced for all age groups from
age 21 on. For most individuals the time thus freed up is spent in the out-of-the-labor-force
state. For others, though, time spent on schooling increases. This is reflected in increased
proportions engaged in secondary and university education, and this increase is still noticeable
for the 31-35 age group.
In the case of the longer-term recession, the ‘substitution into leisure,’ that is, the transfer
of time from work into voluntary unemployment is even more pronounced, and persists for as
long as the unemployment rate remains above the baseline. The increase in the proportion
enrolled at 4-year colleges and universities, while small, continues for even longer, and registers
even for the oldest age group. It is worth noting, though, that the contemporaneous effects of
this ten-period recession lie primarily in the increased proportions in the nonwork-nonschool
state. In both experiments, the rate of college completion as of age 38 increases beyond that
found in the baseline simulation, but this increase is very small.
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Table 5.7: Simulated Activity Proportions, by Age Group
Ages Work School 4-year 2-year OLF
Baseline
16-20 .331 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .584 .071 .155 .033 .156
26-30 .727 .041 .073 .029 .129
31-35 .796 .026 .041 .020 .117
36-41 .766 .042 .054 .043 .095
All (16-41) .594 .160 .094 .031 .121
Single-period recession at age 21
16-20 .331 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .582 .072 .156 .033 .158
26-30 .726 .041 .074 .030 .129
31-35 .795 .027 .042 .020 .117
36-41 .765 .042 .054 .043 .095
All (16-41) .593 .161 .094 .031 .121
Ten-period recession beginning at age 21
16-20 .330 .436 .103 .030 .100
21-25 .581 .072 .156 .033 .160
26-30 .723 .042 .074 .029 .132
31-35 .794 .027 .042 .020 .117
36-41 .765 .042 .055 .043 .095
All (16-41) .592 .161 .094 .031 .122
Table 5.8: Effect on Educational Attainment
Experiment Enrollment Rate, Ages 18-19 Eit ≥ 16 by Age 38
4-year 2-year
Baseline .1398 .0420 .2881
Single-period recession at age 21 .1398 .0420 .2895
Ten-period recession beginning at age 21 .1398 .0420 .2890
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
I find effects of tuition and labor market conditions on college enrollment that are mea-
surable but modest. For example, my simulation indicates a 6% increase in the number of
individuals who attain 16 years of schooling attendant on a reduction in tuition of $1000.
By contrast, I find that a policy that fully subsidizes postsecondary education provided an
individual has worked full-time for one year, will raise the number of persons with a stock
of 16 years of education by only 2.4%. Finally, I also find that the bulk of any voluntary
reduction in full-time work resulting from increased unemployment rates (and the wage losses
implied by it) is spent on activities other than schooling.
The relatively modest sizes of the simulated effects point to the importance of nonpecu-
niary factors in the decision to enter or leave schooling, particularly the high psychic costs
of returning to school after a long absence. It is also possible that the small policy effects
are the result of enrollment limits, and of eligibility and selection rules employed by higher
quality colleges. Thus the insensitivity to tuition and other factors may be an indication of
restrictions on the total number of slots available at colleges. This remains an important
topic for future research to assess.
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